What are the reasons why farmers seeking land expropriation are in trouble?

First, the causes of the policy of "returning farmland"

Since the reform and opening up, in economically developed areas such as coastal areas and inland suburbs, the rapid economic development has brought about the continuous expansion of urban scale, the rapid expansion of industrial parks, the massive expropriation of farmers' collective land and the sharp reduction of land, and the problems of farmers' basic living security and long-term livelihood in the future have become more and more prominent.

Before land expropriation, farmers relied on land management and were self-sufficient with low living costs. After land expropriation, farmers who lost their land still live in the countryside, but their actual status is no different from that of farmers. All lifestyles will become urbanized, and all daily necessities will be bought in the market, which will greatly increase the cost of living. After the land was expropriated, although farmers got some compensation, the compensation amount was obviously lower than the basic living expenses of farmers after losing their land. For example, the compensation for land acquisition in Shishan Town, Nanhai District is 8 100-27,000 yuan per mu, but actually only 30% of the compensation can be paid to farmers at one time, about 5,000 yuan, and the rest will be paid in the form of year-end dividends, about 1200 yuan per person per year. Farmers generally believe that the compensation for land acquisition is too low to solve the livelihood problem after land acquisition. At the same time, due to farmers' lack of entrepreneurial ability, the compensation they get cannot be converted into "living money" and it is difficult to become "venture capital". For the time being, the government has no preferential policies to guide farmers to revitalize compensation, and many farmers can only sit on empty pockets. The way out for farmers' life has become an urgent problem at present. two

In addition, with the increasing degree of industrialization and urbanization covering rural areas, rural residents in these areas are slowly transforming into citizens, and the original rural villages are gradually transforming into residential communities. However, a considerable part of the government's public finances do not cover rural areas. Without the financial support of the state and the government, rural collectives have to bear public responsibilities such as community service and social management. Such as the social management functions of implementing policies such as family planning, conscription, special care, public security and disaster relief, as well as personnel salaries, road environment maintenance and improvement, partial compulsory education and social security. Community management and public expenditure also increase with the development of economy, the improvement of living cost and quality of life and the change of population situation. In order to realize its social management function, community organizations must require rural community collectives to have a certain source of economic income to ensure public expenditure (Kong Shanguang, 2006, P74).

With the continuous advancement of industrialization and urbanization and the sustained and rapid development of secondary and tertiary industries, the demand for land is increasing and the value of land is getting higher and higher. Compared with the compensation fees levied by the government in the past, it is far from the actual use value. For example, in the past, all land acquisition compensation was more than 20,000 yuan per mu, but now the rent of collectively rented land is 1 10,000 yuan per year, which is equivalent to the government's compensation for land acquisition in less than three years. Moreover, the land belongs to farmers' collectives and can benefit permanently, unlike the permanent loss of land ownership after being expropriated by the government for one-time compensation. At present, the rental income of land (and its factories and shops) is far greater than that of agricultural farming. Farmers are highly aware of the value of land and its role in their own future, and do not want to be expropriated and lose their land ownership forever, which makes it more and more difficult for the government to acquire land (turn it into state-owned land), and conflicts of interest occur from time to time.

In order to solve the basic living security and long-term livelihood of landless farmers, as well as the collective public expenditure of rural communities, and to alleviate the conflicts of interests in land acquisition, according to the spirit 3 of relevant documents such as "reserving a certain proportion of state-owned land according to planned purposes and determining it for use by landless rural collective economic organizations", the policy of "returning land" for land acquisition was put forward.

The existing master plan is that after the government expropriates farmers' collective land, it will be returned to rural collective organizations for use according to 30% of the expropriated area (previously 10%-20%), also known as "reserved land", which will be included in the local land use master plan together with the government land expropriation, of which 20% will be owned by villagers' groups (economic societies) and 10%. If the collective organization's "returning farmland" is too scattered, it can be brought into the unified planning of the development zone through centralized replacement, and the development zone will be equipped with infrastructure such as sewage, roads, water supply and power supply, and take advantage of the investment attraction advantages of the development zone for development. The rent of "returning farmland" (and its factories and shops) has become the main income of rural collective economic organizations with joint-stock cooperative system, which mainly focuses on land management, and is the main source of collective public expenditure and dividends for members of collective organizations. For example, the "returning farmland" of Tanglian Village Committee of Shishan Town in Nanhai District and its subordinate villagers' groups in the industrial park is developed through the "radiation effect" of the development zone. In 2005, the collective income of village groups was more than 4 million yuan, which rose to more than 9 million yuan in 2006. Therefore, in the long run, this is a good policy to solve the basic living security of landless farmers.

Second, "returning farmland" involves the interests of farmers.

However, the good policy has not fully benefited the landless farmers, because "returning land" can only be legally applied for construction for personal use or lease, otherwise it is illegal. However, in the actual operation process, there are some problems, such as the limitation of land use index, the high cost of issuing permits, illegal use and so on.

1, land use index constraint. According to the law, construction land comes from collectively owned non-agricultural construction land or state-owned land. Occupation of agricultural land, agricultural land conversion procedures must be handled in accordance with the relevant provisions and land use indicators, and only after obtaining the land use certificate can the construction procedures for development and construction be handled. According to the Outline of National Land Use Master Plan (1997-20 10) approved by the State Council, by 20 10, the cultivated land occupied by non-agricultural construction will not exceed 29.5 million mu, and the reduction of cultivated land area in China will be controlled within 966 1000 mu, and the amount of cultivated land in China will be/. The reduction of cultivated land area made a breakthrough in 2004; Farmland occupied by non-agricultural construction will break through in 2006). Take Foshan as an example. At present, there are large-scale industrial parks in all districts of Foshan, among which the top ten industrial park projects occupy almost 80% of the idle land in Foshan. 6. In 2003, the construction land area of Foshan City was 654.38+006.8 thousand hectares, which exceeded the control index of 86.6 thousand hectares in the land planning of Guangdong Province. Indicators such as the amount of cultivated land and the amount of construction land issued by the higher authorities have all broken through. According to the annual land use plan issued by the provincial government, in 2007, the index of new construction land in Foshan was only 10890 mu, and the index of supplementary cultivated land for land consolidation (reclamation) was 6750 mu, accounting for only half of the actual demand.

In the past, the government gave priority to industrial parks developed and managed by itself and took care of large projects, resulting in "returning land" without land use certificates. Without the land use certificate, the factory can't be rented out or built, and the land is leveled, so it can't be cultivated, so it can only be barren and can't bring benefits to the rural collective.

2. The problem of high cost of land use certificate. Although the "land withdrawal" is for the self-use of rural collective economic organizations, there is no need to pay the paid land use fee for new construction land, but it is still necessary to pay the agricultural land conversion fee for handling the land use permit, such as the land reclamation fee of 25 yuan per square meter and the cultivated land occupied by the basic farmland protection area of 15 yuan; Farmland occupation tax per square meter 8 yuan. In addition, agricultural insurance funds, irrigation and water conservancy construction fees, land acquisition management fees, etc. At present, the cost of handling land use certificate is more than 40 thousand yuan per mu. In other words, if you want to rent 100 mu as "returning farmland", you have to invest more than 4 million yuan to get benefits. If the workshop is leased, another construction cost is about150,000 yuan (calculated by building density of 70% and building cost of 350 yuan /m2), with a total investment of about 2,000 yuan.

Recently, the local government has preferential policies. In places where land acquisition belongs to village committees and village groups, village organizations only need to pay a land use certificate of about 9,000 yuan/mu, and the industrial park is responsible for the rest, reducing the collective burden of villages. However, "returning land" still has no land indicators, so it is still a castle in the air.

3. The problem of "returned land" being used illegally. Due to the limitation of land use index and the high cost of obtaining a permit, some villagers' groups use the "temporary land" with a short use period to go through the construction application procedures in the form of "temporary buildings" and then rent out the land or factory buildings. According to the regulations, the service life of these temporary construction projects generally does not exceed two years. After the expiration, it must be dismantled by itself for at most one year. Otherwise, it is illegal construction. Even if the government expropriates these lands, the ancillary buildings cannot be compensated. However, the actual situation is that at present, a large number of land and buildings in rural collectives that have exceeded the use period are being illegally used, and some of them are directly rented without going through any formalities.

In 2002, the industrial land in Nanhai District was * * */kloc-0.5 million mu, of which 73,000 mu was still owned by the collective, accounting for almost half. This figure does not include the non-agricultural land converted by some collective economic organizations into homesteads, villages and some orchards. Take Pingzhou District (later changed to sub-district office and merged into Guicheng sub-district office) as an example. The statistics of collective non-agricultural construction land in this area in the Municipal Bureau of Land and Resources are 2000 mu, but actually it is 8000 mu, which is three times higher than the reported figure. In fact, it is difficult to count the actual amount of collective non-agricultural land, and farmers are unwilling to talk about it and the collective is unwilling to report it. This phenomenon is more prominent in economically developed districts and towns (Gao Shengping and Liu Shouying, 2007).

On the one hand, a large number of "land withdrawal" can't apply for land use certificates due to the restrictions of land use indicators, and the processing cost is too high to bear. It is difficult for the "land withdrawal" policy to play its role, which leads to a great response from a large number of villagers whose land has been requisitioned, hiding unstable factors; On the other hand, a large number of collective construction land is mostly transferred in private, indirect and abnormal ways, which has caused the contradiction between local government's administration according to law and improving farmers' income and safeguarding farmers' interests.

Third, practical problems and legal dilemmas.

1986, the first land law, divided into two chapters, separated the state construction land from the township (town) village construction land, and stipulated that "state-owned land can be used by units under ownership by the whole people or units under collective ownership according to law, and state-owned land and collective land can be used by individuals according to law". "Township (town) village enterprise construction needs to make

To use land, an application must be submitted to the land administration department of the people's government at or above the county level with the design task book or other approval documents approved by the local people's government at or above the county level, and the approval shall be given by the local people's government at or above the county level according to the approval authority stipulated by the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government. "Thanks to the relatively loose environment of construction land management at that time, farmers set up enterprises on collectively owned land. The rapid development of township enterprises has changed the traditional mode of national industrialization, allowing hundreds of millions of China farmers to participate in the process of industrialization with their own land and labor, so the rise of township enterprises has also been recognized and supported by the central policy.

1998 revised Land Law unified the relevant provisions of national construction land and township (town) village construction land into the chapter of "construction land", but added "if the land occupied by construction involves the conversion of agricultural land into construction land, the examination and approval procedures for the conversion of agricultural land shall be handled" and "if the land collectively owned by farmers is used for non-agricultural construction according to law, the people's government at the county level shall register it, issue certificates and confirm the construction. There is also a clause that "any unit or individual that needs to use land for construction must apply for the use of state-owned land according to law", although there is room for "the establishment of township enterprises and villagers to use land collectively owned by farmers of their collective economic organizations with legal approval, or the use of land collectively owned by farmers for township (town) village facilities and public welfare undertakings with legal approval". However, it is very difficult for rural collective organizations to convert their own land into non-agricultural construction purposes, and the provision of "balance of occupation and compensation" has greatly increased the cost of land use.

According to the current land management law, only collectives can use the land collectively owned by farmers in legally approved collective economic organizations for "setting up township enterprises and villagers to build houses" or "township (town) village public facilities and public utilities". The problem is that township collective enterprises have some disadvantages, such as unclear property rights, unclear interests, no distinction between government and enterprise, and imperfect system. Most villagers don't support the collective to run enterprises directly. Even if land is used as a joint venture, there are still some problems, such as the absence of collective property owners, the shareholders of funds are often controlled by insiders, and the real losses of enterprises are artificially caused, and it is difficult for land investors to pay dividends, while the losses of enterprises are still owed by village collectives. Therefore, most of them take the form of renting (land, factories or shops), which is easy to supervise and has fewer problems. Community collective economic organizations such as rural joint-stock cooperative system, which mainly focuses on land management, are gradually popularized, and land management has become an important way to develop collective economy. However, the land management law does not allow farmers to collectively transfer, transfer or lease their collectively owned land for non-agricultural construction, so collective organizations renting non-agricultural construction land are not protected by law. It is illegal for farmers to collectively lease or transfer non-agricultural construction land, and even collective construction land cannot be transferred, transferred or leased. These regulations are seriously incompatible with the present situation of rural land and economic development in these areas.

In this regard, there are only four legal outlets for farmers' collective land: one is to continue farming, but the income from non-agricultural use is quite different; Second, the village collective investment (or joint-stock system) to set up enterprises can turn the land into collective non-agricultural use; Third, the village collective paid a large sum of money to turn into state-owned land and obtained the right to use state-owned land in the name of the village collective; Fourth, all of them were expropriated by the government and received compensation at one time. However, as previously analyzed, the villagers are unwilling to accept these aspects, and the contrast between farmers' desire to get rich and the actual laws and regulations is great, which leads to the rural collective "taking risks" and breaking through the constraints of laws and regulations, forming a large number of collective non-agricultural land that does not meet the requirements of laws and regulations.

Jiang Shengsan and Liu Shouying of the State Council Development Research Center pointed out that it is an indisputable fact that collective construction land enters the market after investigating the present situation of the Pearl River Delta, especially the South China Sea. Due to the strict restrictions of the current laws, most of the collective construction land is transferred in a private, indirect and abnormal way. Although this invisible circulation has been acquiesced by the local government, its hidden dangers are obvious: first, it conflicts with existing laws, which is not conducive to protecting farmers' interests and affecting the long-term expectation of enterprise development; The second is to form a competitive price reduction, loss of interests, and irregular land market. This massive, universal, inexhaustible and forbidden spontaneous circulation of non-agricultural construction land has made the current laws and regulations retrogress (Jiang Shengsan and Liu Shouying, 2003).

Fourth, the contradiction between cultivated land protection and economic development

Based on the consideration of per capita cultivated land area and food security, China has implemented the strictest land management system, which specifically stipulates that the occupation of cultivated land should be balanced with the development and reclamation of cultivated land, and the cultivated land with the same quantity and quality can even be flexible, and those without conditions for reclamation can also be "purchased" in different places.

Index ",pay land reclamation fees, earmarked for the reclamation of new arable land. However, according to official statistics, from 1.997 to 2006, including returning farmland to forest (grass), agricultural structure adjustment and disaster reduction, the total net reduction area of cultivated land reached 1.28505 million mu, and the cultivated land occupied by non-agricultural construction was only 29 1.3 million mu (table 1. Among them, the data of farmland occupied by non-agricultural construction is unbelievable. When we walk around the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta and economically developed areas, we can know that the cultivated land occupied by non-agricultural construction in the past decade will be far greater than the official statistics. However, the reality that the net reduction area of cultivated land is 6.5438+0.28505 million mu is in great contrast with the strictest land management system in China.

Table 1: 1997-2006 National Cultivated Land Stock and Its Change Unit: 10,000 mu

Note: The data of 1 and 1997-2000 come from the annual environmental protection status announcement of China by the State Environmental Protection Administration; 2.2001-the data of 2006 come from the China Land and Resources Bulletin of the Ministry of Land and Resources in various years; 3. According to the data calculation, the cultivated land decreased by/kloc-0 1.28505 million mu in ten years, of which non-agricultural construction occupied 2910.3 million mu. 4. China's cultivated land area does not include Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.

At present, the cultivated land area in China is less than 654.38+0.8 billion mu, which is only 27 million mu away from the binding target of 654.38+0.8 billion mu set in the 11th Five-Year Plan. According to the average net reduction rate of cultivated land in the past ten years, this goal has been exceeded in just two years, and the contradiction between cultivated land protection and economic development is getting bigger and bigger. The author learned from personal experience that after the development and occupation of "farmland protection areas" in some places, the revised plan transferred some "farmland protection areas" to undeveloped barren hills and semi-barren hills (it is difficult to grow food at all), and even rural clan ancestral halls with a history of hundreds of years became "farmland protection areas" in the planning. Therefore, the author estimates that if there is no phenomenon of concealing the cultivated land area in various places (through the rectification of the land market in 2004, it is found that the cultivated land area occupied by the construction that has been built but not changed in previous years is 6.5438+0.477 million hectares, which has been adjusted on the published national statistical data), the "red line" of cultivated land in China may have already broken through.

1994 after the implementation of the tax-sharing system, the financial rights and powers of local governments are asymmetric. Under the conditions of the established restraint and incentive mechanism, local governments are forced by financial pressure, competition among jurisdictions and the pressure of political achievements to pursue GDP growth in order to increase fiscal revenue to achieve "power"-the impulse to obtain political achievements. A series of laws, regulations and policies on land have opened the door for local governments to make money from land, which has led to a large number of land violations by local governments. For example, the Land Administration Law and the Regulations for the Implementation of the Land Administration Law stipulate that "the state may expropriate or requisition land and make compensation according to law for the needs of public interests", "the sum of land compensation and resettlement subsidies shall not exceed 30 times of the average annual output value in the first three years of land acquisition" and "the dispute over land acquisition compensation and resettlement will not affect the implementation of the land acquisition plan". Obviously, the land ownership of rural areas and farmers is in a passive position and cannot effectively protect the interests of rural areas and farmers. It also provides great legal convenience for the government to abuse the name of "public interest" to harm the interests of farmers and cause a large reduction of cultivated land. For example, "cases of illegal land grant account for 80% of the land area, mainly local governments and cases with the government as the main body of violation, 80% of illegal land grant are citizens, individuals or enterprises, and 20%", and "the criminal punishment rate for land violation is only 0. 1%". In 2006, the national land area was 232,500 hectares, and the transfer price was 767.689 billion yuan, almost all of which became the extra-budgetary income of local governments. We must reflect on the existing system.

There is an undeniable fact that there is a huge contradiction between cultivated land protection and economic development, especially in economically developed areas, the benefits of non-agricultural land use are far greater than farming. Farmers and local governments have no motivation to protect cultivated land for their own interests, and have repeatedly broken through the constraints of cultivated land protection. Therefore, we must adjust the land management system according to local conditions, instead of rigidly implementing farmland protection measures. For example, in the process of industrialization and urbanization in the Pearl River Delta region, the farmland infrastructure and farming environment have been destroyed, such as water source irrigation, soil erosion, pests and rodents. The stock of cultivated land is simply difficult to cultivate, and even if it is barely cultivated, the income from construction land is higher and more stable. In addition, at present, in many economically developed areas, many lands are polluted by toxic heavy metals such as chromium and mercury. Even if these cultivated lands are barely cultivated, they may produce some harmful agricultural products. In the long run, it is not worth the loss to continue farming. This phenomenon also exists in developed areas such as the Yangtze River Delta. These lands can't be converted into non-agricultural construction land with higher income, which will seriously distort the use value of the land and lead to the "desperate" behavior of breaking through the constraints of laws and regulations. For the rural "returning farmland" for non-agricultural construction purposes that have been included in the local land use master plan, under the existing land management system, the land-expropriated farmers are pushed to fill the soil and cannot cultivate, and their income is lost due to the conversion index of agricultural land.

Economic development is bound to occupy land, and the income from non-agricultural land use in economically developed areas is far greater than that from agricultural cultivation. How to solve the contradiction between economic development and food security in economically developed and underdeveloped areas (mainly grain-producing areas) and balance the contradiction between farmers' income and economic development is indeed a problem that must be solved.

Suggestions on verbs (abbreviation of verb)

1. Modify relevant laws and regulations. Clarify the specific meaning of using "national public interest" and other terms in government land acquisition, and the land used for business projects cannot start the national land acquisition right. Collective farmers and contracted farmers have equal rights to negotiate, and the system of "land acquisition, compensation and lease" should be thoroughly reformed.

Degree. It turns out that China's constitution stipulates that rural land belongs to rural collective ownership. Then, on the premise of complying with land use planning and land use control, the "peasant collective" naturally has the right to dispose of collective land (including collective construction land) and enter the market based on the basic principle of ownership. However, Article 43 of the Land Management Law stipulates that the establishment of township enterprises and the construction of villagers' houses are approved by law to use the land owned by farmers of the collective economic organizations, or the construction of public facilities and public welfare undertakings in townships (towns) and villages is approved by law to use the land owned by farmers. Under the current system, rural land must be converted into state-owned land to enter the market. Farmers' compensation for land acquisition is only related to their land cultivation, and the differential income in the process of land acquisition and conversion is taken away by the government. Under the temptation of self-interest motivation, the state will tend to abuse administrative power and monopolize the position, improperly share or even completely deprive the collective land ownership to accumulate wealth (Gao Shengping, Liu Shouying, 2007).

At present, whether it is the collective shareholding system of rural land in Nanhai, the Measures for the Management of the Transfer of the Right to Use Collective Construction Land in Guangdong Province, which was implemented in 2005 10, and Chengdu-Chongqing's becoming a national pilot zone for the comprehensive reform of urban and rural areas, allowing the contracted management right of land to directly participate in shares, there are a lot of land transfer facts and local policies and regulations that have already conflicted with national laws. However, the reform in China in the past 30 years has been carried out from bottom to top, and the existing land management law must be revised if it wants to adapt to the economic and social development.

2. Make special adjustments to the geographical scope of farmland occupation and compensation balance and farmland occupation tax. Units and individuals occupying cultivated land for non-agricultural construction are taxpayers of cultivated land occupation tax. The purpose of levying farmland occupation tax is to "rationally use land resources, strengthen land management, and protect agricultural farmland". "Farmland occupation tax is calculated according to the actual farmland area occupied by taxpayers, and it is levied at one time according to the stipulated tax amount". According to the per capita farmland area and economic development, it ranges from 1 to 10 yuan per square meter. XII (The new regulations were implemented on June 5438+1 October1day, 2008, and the cultivated land occupation tax was adjusted to four grades, with an amount of 5-50 yuan per mu, but it was still levied at one time. However, only such a low level of one-off taxes and fees can not play a role in the rational use of land resources, and the income from grain production in grain-producing areas is also very small. Therefore, it is necessary to make special adjustments to the farmland occupation tax to solve the contradiction between farmland protection and economic development and balance the income gap between developed and underdeveloped grain-producing areas.

It is suggested that the farmland occupation tax should be changed into a one-time grain subsidy of 3 ~ 5 yuan per square meter per year, which is specially used in grain-producing areas. Such a tax burden is completely affordable in economically developed areas (for the above-mentioned "returning farmland" in rural areas, no other fees are charged except for farmland reclamation fees and farmland occupation taxes). After adjustment, economically developed areas can use land for advantageous non-agricultural construction purposes in the overall land use planning to develop the economy, and promote the improvement of land use efficiency through tax adjustment. The cultivated land reclamation fee is guaranteed to be used for the "occupation and compensation balance" of cultivated land. XIII. Develop new cultivated land and expand the geographical scope of "occupation and compensation balance". It is even possible to plan national land functional areas, that is, agriculture (grain-producing areas), industry, forestry and nature reserves except cities and towns, and implement inter-provincial balance to ensure the "bottom line" of cultivated land area. Farmland occupation tax is used for grain subsidies in grain-producing areas. After deducting the collection cost, it is 2000 ~ 3000 yuan per mu per year (calculated by occupying cultivated land), which is greater than the income from growing grain in grain-producing areas. If only the total cultivated land occupied by non-agricultural construction in this decade is 2910.3 million mu, and the cultivated land occupation tax is 2,000 yuan per mu/year, it will be about 58 billion yuan, five times the amount of direct subsidies to grain farmers in 2004 and four times that of 200610.4 billion yuan. It is more than 1.5 times of the total direct subsidies to grain farmers in the three years from 2004 to 2006. Coupled with the original amount of direct grain subsidy, the effect is more obvious, which can solve the contradiction between cultivated land protection and economic development, balance the income gap between urban and rural areas in developed areas and between developed areas and underdeveloped grain-producing areas, and ensure the per capita cultivated land area and food security.

3. The collective ownership of construction land can remain unchanged. It is conceivable that the advancement of urbanization and industrialization in the future will inevitably turn a large number of farmers' collective agricultural land into construction land. The government's planning must consider farmers' wishes and cannot exclude their participation. Originally, the expansion of construction land formed by industrialization and urbanization is not necessarily accompanied by the transfer of land ownership. For example, the right to use industrial and commercial state-owned land for 40 or 50 years can completely keep the collective ownership unchanged (there is no need to turn it into state-owned land), that is, farmers are paid a one-time rent for 40 or 50 years as the capital for farmers to enter the city, and the land will still be owned by the collective after the expiration; It can also take the form of "returning land", and the construction land converted from agricultural land is owned by farmers in a certain proportion, which is used for leasing to obtain long-term rental income as a guarantee for farmers to integrate into the city; You can even keep all the collective ownership and rent it to users. The term of contract lease refers to the service life of state-owned industrial and commercial land. These measures are not contradictory to land use indicators, urban planning and local development, and also take care of the long-term interests of farmers.

4. The differences between urban and rural areas in economically developed areas can not be ignored. Some people may think that the income of rural residents in economically developed areas is higher than that of urban residents or basically the same, and the previous "rural to non-agricultural" has now become "non-agricultural", but this is not the case. For example, although Foshan had unified the registered population of the whole city into household registration as early as 2004, in 2005, the per capita disposable income of urban residents in Nanhai was18,217 yuan, and the per capita cash income of rural residents was 8,743 yuan, a difference of two times. In 2006, the per capita disposable income of urban residents in Foshan was18,894 yuan (the annual per capita wage of urban workers was 25,207 yuan), and the per capita net income of rural residents was 8,224 yuan, with a difference of more than two times. However, there is still a big gap between urban and rural government services and social security. The rural collective economy must bear the public welfare expenses such as education, health, public security, infrastructure construction and social security in the community, and the social burden is heavy. The main source of rural public expenditure, especially social security (medical care, pension, etc.). ), are land acquisition compensation and land (factory) rent.

For example, Foshan stipulates that "the basic old-age insurance premium for rural residents whose land has been expropriated shall be borne by the district, town (street) level finance and rural collective economic organizations. District, town (street) finance shall be subsidized according to the proportion of 10% ~ 30%, and village (neighborhood) and group collective economic organizations shall bear 40% ~ 80%. If they meet the requirements, they can get subsidies ranging from 120 yuan to 300 yuan every month. " From this, it can be seen that the burden of villages and collective economic organizations still accounts for the majority. Only in this way can the policy of "returning land" be introduced to ensure the basic living security and long-term livelihood of landless farmers in the future. Therefore, under the current system, it is still a long way to go to narrow the gap between urban and rural areas in developed areas, and it is a long-term and arduous task in underdeveloped areas that cannot be ignored.

Conclusion of intransitive verbs

Land is an important carrier and one of the most important elements of human economic and social development. Land system is the general name of land relations under specific social and economic conditions, and it is the most important and basic system in all social forms. The relationship between land possession and use is the basis of social land relations, and then reflects the socio-economic nature. Experienced twice since the founding of New China.

The reform of land system has had a far-reaching impact on China's economy and society.

With the transition and continuous transformation from planned economy to market economy system in China, the economy is developing rapidly, and the value of land is getting higher and higher, which attracts more and more attention. At the same time, the problems of population, resources, environment and development have become increasingly prominent, and the tension between man and land has become the main contradiction. In addition, the major differences between urban and rural areas under the structure of "dual society" and the constraints of land on farmers make land interest disputes the focus of farmers' struggle. The existing laws and regulations conflict with the facts of land circulation and local policies and regulations, and cannot effectively protect the interests of farmers. Good policies can't play a role, and farmers can't really share the fruits of reform and economic development.

Land problem is the core of "three rural issues", and land is the most important and main property of farmers. The report of the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China put forward for the first time: "Create conditions for more people to own property income", and the No.1 document of the Central Committee in 2008 also put forward: "Further clarify the legal status of farmers' family property, protect farmers' collective property income rights, and create conditions for more farmers to obtain property income". Therefore, it is necessary to re-examine and reform the unreasonable land system and related supporting policies, revise land management laws and regulations, allow collective land ownership to be used for non-agricultural construction without changing its nature, balance cultivated land in different places and expand the balanced area, adjust the collection method of cultivated land occupation tax, ensure the per capita cultivated land area and food security, and solve the contradiction and regional differences between cultivated land protection and economic development, so as to adapt to the overall situation of economic and social development and allow farmers to obtain more property income.