Mr. Nan Guo's Principles of Story Economics

After analyzing this point and looking back at the fund system, we can find that the key lies in: no matter how well the fund company "blows" its "profit", the result can also be "guaranteed by drought and flood". According to economic analysis, this actually increases the moral hazard of fund companies. In fact, this is similar to the well-known principle of "eating the same pot". In this case, it will naturally cause fund companies to regard "scale" as "catching up", which is caused by economic rationality or maximization behavior, and the famous "rational person" hypothesis in economics can also be seen. In reality, this phenomenon is at least one of the equilibrium solutions of the game, although many people, especially investors, do not want to see this equilibrium solution.

Of course, we can also think that there is something wrong with the incentive mechanism of fund management system, which distorts the behavior of fund companies. Like the familiar information asymmetry, this is the well-known incentive incompatibility in information economics. In the final analysis, fund companies have failed to maximize their own income while taking into account the maximization of investors' income.

In this process, investors are responding to the old saying that "I am a fish, I am a fish", and it is easy to be "double exploited" by fund companies: if management is not good, fees will be charged. The defect of incentive mechanism has caused fund companies to pay more attention to their own scale and ignore their profitability. Obviously, at this time, it is necessary to link the extraction of fund management fees with fund performance.

As Wang Lianzhou, a scholar, said, you can allow good performance to expand the scale and even increase management fees; For those with poor performance, it is necessary to strictly limit the scale expansion and reduce or even cancel the management fee. This is what we usually call "more work, more gain". Changes in the rules of the game often make the results of the game very different from before, and the inadaptability of incentives can also be fundamentally changed. The rise of incentive theory in theoretical economics is actually driven by this reality, and the future Nobel Prize in Economics is likely to fall to this one, which is just a digression.

Of course, there are many reasons for the decline in the performance of fund companies, such as structural adjustment is also a very important reason. But we must not turn a blind eye to the phenomenon of "excessive" use of funds. We can think that efforts to eliminate this phenomenon are not only the need to improve the fund system, but also the need for the long-term development of the fund.