What was the combat effectiveness of the national army during the Anti-Japanese War?

In fact, the national army is even more unbearable than recorded in mainland textbooks. The mainland has given the government a lot of face for United front. Everyone posted a lot of black materials. Let me talk about the reasons for the poor combat effectiveness of the national army. Discussing this issue can also indirectly correct the name of the grass-roots soldiers of the national army, so I advise the fruit powder to look good and improve the posture level.

Read me a sentence first.

"Amateurs talk about strategy. Professionals talk about logistics. " -John Lyman (former US Secretary of the Navy)

Most of this sentence is translated into "layman talks about strategy, expert talks about logistics". This is actually inaccurate, and the bureau translated it as "layman talks about strategy, expert talks about management". This is appropriate.

The modern army and the mercenary army in the classical period are divided by Gustav's reform, and the biggest difference lies in management.

This kind of management is multifaceted. Of course, the management of logistics, personnel and discipline is part of it, but what is more important is the army's own work-battlefield management.

Yes! The battlefield is to be managed. The management level of an army on the battlefield determines the tactics it can adopt and ultimately its combat effectiveness.

Regarding logistics, assembly and marching, you can refer to my past answers. How strong is China's army? -Get the general divorce answer from the picture.

This answer does not mention battlefield control.

In fact, when an army appears on the battlefield, it must assume the management and control of its assembly, garrison area and marching route. The so-called military control. This control not only ensures its own safety and the smooth flow of information and supplies, but also ensures the safety of the poor around the battlefield. The army has the obligation to inform the civilians and give them the conditions for evacuation.

These mission requirements determine that the army cannot send a few sentries to guard the door, so it is necessary to be vigilant when marching!

The stronger the combat effectiveness of the troops, the greater the scope of their battlefield control. In addition to the areas directly occupied and controlled by the main forces, it is also necessary to arrange the investigation plan reasonably and send investigation troops, either to go out, break through or wander around the troops. These scouts are the eyes, ears and tentacles of the troops. At least so far, modern technical investigation methods are still irreplaceable. (For example, satellite information has a long update period and a huge amount of information, which cannot be identified and retrieved. )

Former scouts should also choose safe and efficient marching routes for large troops. Large troops rarely travel along a single route. There are many tragedies that do this, such as "Urban Garden Action". Have you been watching Far Bridge? ) Choose a camp for the troops.

Scouts wandering around and behind the scenes are responsible for alerting the enemy's movements and conducting anti-reconnaissance operations against enemy scouts.

At the same time, there should be stations on the supply line and necessary guards should be sent.

This is what the staff should do! Stop saying they fart!

In fact, if the staff does not give strength, it will also kill the three armed forces.

Such as the story of Huang and the famous pontoon bridge. In all fairness, letting Huang consider whether to erect a pontoon bridge is itself a failure of the national army staff system.

Let's talk about the pontoon bridge first, then the engineer.

The so-called "opening the road on the mountain and bridging the bridge when encountering water" depends on how to build it. In fact, engineers with the ability to advance synchronously with large troops can already be regarded as a strong army. In this world, the "combat projects" that can really fight on the front line even before the main action are basically counted by one hand.

Like my American emperor. For a while, the bridge was repaired, but the first to be defeated was the retreating Japanese army. ...

Although the terrapin is a native, it was brought out from Anyuan Coal Mine during the Red Army period and can work in the fire line. Compared with the national army engineers who have no fighting capacity, the engineers of the Red Army are elites and "small groups".

All right, let's sum it up. Why is it so difficult to send scouts, maintain military stations and build combat projects? -because they are all alone in the vertical management of large troops.

We can see that the national army is actually better at defense. In fact, the Battle of Taierzhuang and the Battle of Hengyang, which played a good role in War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, both played this advantage. Han Deqin, who was severely taught to be a man by the New Fourth Army in Huangqiao, was less like a chicken in Caodian. The reason is that the problems mentioned above are relatively simple and easy when defending a fixed position.

In fact, the national army cannot control the areas beyond the range of the main queue rifles. They always knew nothing about the Japanese army and the Communist army close at hand. Their logistics line is maintained by forced migrant workers, and the death and escape rate of migrant workers is high. According to Jiang Menglin, the headmaster of Peking University, "Nine times out of ten, the able-bodied man died on the road". No matter which side the Kuomintang and the Communist Party are on, no one seems to question President Jiang's credibility. In fact, this figure is slightly exaggerated. Nine times out of ten, many people really ran away. But it can also be seen that President Jiang is obviously angry. )

In addition to supervising civilian workers, the national army also sent a large number of troops to protect the military station. Otherwise, the officer took it, why can't the soldiers take it?

Scouts who are completely separated from the big forces and go deep into the enemy lines cannot be maintained by military discipline alone.

However, the ability to control the battlefield is not good, which actually determines that tactics such as attack, penetration, parallel pursuit (these tactics were pioneered by Sun Wu) and central flowering are actually impossible to implement.

My favorite line in the American imperialists' blockbuster "The Battle of Gettysburg" is this: "The general came to the battlefield, just like God came to earth!" And poor General Huang is obviously not even the Dragon King of the River. In history, did someone really say that during the Civil War? Ask a powerful friend for advice. )

On the other hand, the Communist Army has established a militia system for a long time, but the militia and devil sticks are obviously not good, and they can still guard the military station (find a village to make pancakes, make quilts and even grenades to accommodate the wounded) and communication lines. (It's easier to monitor the road than to investigate it on the spot)

Field investigation is a project that the Communist Army attaches great importance to. Political mobilization and ideological transformation let soldiers know why they are fighting. This is a necessary quality for a small group of people to break away from vertical management and go deep into enemy lines. Please refer to the American imperialists blockbuster "Saving Private Ryan". Please forgive me for always mentioning American blockbusters.

There is no scout to calibrate the benchmark and provide shooting calibration. The energy of the cannon is at most half.

Therefore, the same number of national armies can send fewer actual troops to participate in the war than the communists. Battlefield control ability is almost negligible. The power of the cannon will also be halved.

The hard injury of all kinds of fruit powder theories is that the military system of the national army can't actually do what they call a miracle. A battlefield like Zhongtiaoshan can only be the result of Jiang Gong's criticism. I can't play the prestige that fruit powder says. For the generals of the national army, even superman, it is no use for the staff team not to give strength. As for the staff officers, they didn't have scouts to pull them out, and they didn't have corrupt stationmasters. Can you blame them? For grass-roots soldiers ... can they bring their own dry food to fight? Even if you can bring your own dry food, you can't educate and mobilize yourself.

Therefore, this is an institutional issue. The national army is basically an army maintained by feudal personal attachment and material employment. As an army that has not completed the transformation of the nation-state army. That's all I can do.