Lao Jiang tells fortune _ Lao Jiang tells fortune in his early years. The Taoist priest gave him "eight characters" and the results came true one by one.

In the past, when describing the great victory of our army, some military works easily exaggerated our army and discredited the enemy, thus simplifying and unilaterally fighting. When General Su Yu recalled the battle in his later years, he pointed out this unhealthy tendency. In particular, some people simply attributed the elimination of Zhang Seventy-four Division to the rash advance of the enemy alone, which inevitably deviated from the historical truth.

First, the fallacy of the theory of independent aggression of the 74th Division.

The battle of Meng Lianggu probably gave the impression to the world that the 74th Division of the Kuomintang Army was arrogant, broke away from its main corps, was surrounded by the 74th Division, and was completely annihilated.

Of course, this actually made a mistake.

Zhang, a professional soldier, and Su Yu are old rivals for many years. Zhang is not unaware of the unpredictability of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression's strategic battles in Su Yu, Soviet Russia, Northern Jiangsu and World War II. He will never make the mistake of going it alone again and give it to Su Yu.

Especially in the northern Jiangsu and southern Shandong campaigns, Su Yu used to divide and rule, and pursued the tactical principle of breaking the weak first, then breaking the strong, first attacking the isolated and scattered enemy, and then attacking the enemy with concentrated action. It can be said that the national generals are familiar with it.

The battle of Laiwu dealt a great blow to the national army. Su Yu was able to seize the opportunity and annihilate Li in one fell swoop, which surprised the national army.

Afterwards, the national army reviewed the Laiwu campaign and thought that the command error was the biggest problem, and summarized three lessons:

First, you can't be moved back and forth by communist party.

Second, it is not appropriate to go it alone.

Third, the troops should not be too scattered, especially the weaker divisions.

These lessons can be said to be very pertinent, hitting the key of Su Yu's tactical thought. Before the Battle of Menglianggu began, all departments of the national army attached great importance to these points.

For example, to prevent mobilization by the communist army, even Tang, who has always been defeated, learned to be smart.

Tang Corps invaded Hua Ye's base in Yimeng Mountain area. In order to create fighter planes to annihilate the enemy in mobile warfare, Su Yu sent three columns south to the eastern section of Longhai Road to attack the rear of the Tang Dynasty.

The strength of the three columns is serious, nearly 100 thousand people, enough to make a scene in northern Jiangsu.

However, Tang was unmoved, judging that Su Yu could not give up the core base area, instead of sending troops to Huiyuan, he ordered his subordinate ministries to move closer together and accelerate the advance to Mengyin.

Tang was very proud and saw through Su Yu's intentions.

Tang Corps has eight divisions, namely 25th Division (Huang), 28th Division (Li Liangrong), 48th Division (), 57th Division (Duan Linmao), 65th Division (Li Zhen), 74th Division (Zhang), 83rd Division () and 7th Army (Zhong You).

Tang claimed that such a huge regiment could not gnaw at me even if it was surrounded by Chen Su.

What Don said is true.

His eight armies (divisions) are only one or two days away from each other, so even if any army has an accident, it is too late to help each other.

Not only Tang said so, but also our army said so.

When the whole 74th Division attacked the front line of Meng Lianggu, the 83rd Division, the 7th Army and the 48th Division were on the right, and the 25th Division was on the left. Among them, the main tasks of the 83rd Division and the 25th Division are to cooperate with the 74th Division to attack Tambu (where Hua Ye headquarters is located). These two divisions are only a dozen miles away from the 74th Division.

What is the concept of a dozen miles? It can be called charging.

So, from late April to early May, Su Yu basically had nothing to do with the Tang Group, and could only defend the weak brigade in Tai 'an among the enemy's heavy troops.

Therefore, Zhang's 74th Division's rash and panic attack did not conform to the situation at that time.

Wishfully thought that our army was waiting for him in Hua Ye, and the 74th Division was trapped, which not only underestimated the IQ of the generals of the national army, but also insulted Su Yu's superb command level.

2. Is there anything wrong with Chiang Kai-shek's layout?

Then why did Su Yu bite the 74th Division and pull it out? Is there a problem with Chiang Kai-shek's overall strategic layout?

At the beginning of 1947, Chiang Kai-shek changed the overall attack to focus on the attack, and invested more than 450,000 people in the Shandong battlefield, including 255,000 mobile attack troops, seeking a decisive battle with Hua Ye's main force of 200,000; In addition, 200,000 people are stationed in Jinan, Xuzhou and southwestern Shandong to undertake strategic response and containment tasks.

Among the main forces, three of the five main forces of the national army (25th Division, 74th Division, 5th Army) were mobilized to form three powerful corps, forming a long snake array in 120, in an attempt to drive Hua Ye out of Yimeng Mountain area, or completely eliminate it, or attack the north of the Yellow River.

There is no big problem with this layout.

In terms of war guidance, Chiang Kai-shek also particularly stressed the need to learn from the lessons of the Laiwu campaign, and defined the war principle of the frontline troops as "close together intensively, slowly and steadily, step by step, and avoid highlighting". It can be said that this kind of campaign cognition is also in line with Su Yu's command characteristics.

I won't elaborate on the specific troops, but I will comment on several major features of Chiang Kai-shek's strategy:

1. No longer take siege as the main goal.

2. Try to avoid being transferred by Chen Su.

3. Seek a decisive battle at the main level, not a small-scale battle.

As a result, the seventy-second division of Tai 'an Campaign was besieged, and Yang Wenquan, the teacher, struggled for help. Fiona Fang thyme, the national army armed to the teeth, but no one came to the rescue. The 75th Division and the 85th Division, which are closest to the 72nd Division, have only one day's journey, and they are indifferent.

After Yang Wenquan was captured, on the one hand, he praised Hua Ye's swiftness, boldness and good artillery tactics, on the other hand, he cursed the stubborn disease that the national army would rather die than surrender.

It is obvious that the factions of the national army don't help each other, but objectively it also reduces the risk of being scattered and annihilated by Hua Ye.

There is not much problem in strategy and tactics. The reason why the 74th Division was defeated actually lies in the commanding genius of General Su Yu and the amazing fighting capacity of Hua Ye troops.

Third, Su Yu's "Playing the Dragon Lantern" made the troops complain.

Playing dragon lanterns is an image metaphor for Chen Yi and Su Yu to mobilize enemy tactics.

Simply put, it is to run back and forth and mobilize the enemy persistently.

First attack Tancheng, in an attempt to mobilize the enemy, followed by the national army, as long as Hua Ye put on a real fight, the national army immediately contracted its troops.

Helpless attack Ningyang and Xintai, followed by the national army. Once Hua Ye is found to have an attempt to panic in the enemy and Dayuan, it will stop reinforcing and wait for the ministries to gather before attacking.

As a result, Taian was besieged, with more than 65,438+10,000 people in Hua Ye and 65,438+10,000 people in the national army. Both sides are waiting for the opportunity to find each other's loopholes.

When the enemy's reinforcements could not be adjusted, Su Yu took the initiative to attack the main force of Tang in an attempt to disrupt the formation of Tang Corps. Tang felt that he was not ready, so he quickly contracted and gathered all the armies and divisions along the Linmeng Highway.

Su Yu carried out the plan to mobilize the enemy five times in a row, but because the national army was very cautious, it did not create the opportunity to divide and annihilate some enemies.

At one time, there were great complaints and criticisms in Hua Ye.

The soldiers made up a jingle, "Commander Chen's telegram clicked, and the soldiers' feet snapped. "complaining about going the wrong way instead of struggling, there is a fire in my stomach.

There are also complaints at the leadership level of the column, complaining that only running without fighting can obviously find an opportunity to destroy an enemy brigade, regiment or even a division, like the Tai 'an campaign, which is not affordable.

Even if there are more complaints, Su Yu always sticks to her judgment. It's not that you can't fight, but that the time is not mature. The gluttonous national army is a brigade and a regiment, which is not cheap, but it will be bitten by the enemy's main force. What Chiang Kai-shek wants most now is a decisive battle. On the balance of total strength, Hua Ye is not dominant.

Therefore, we can only wait patiently and look for fighters patiently.

The Central Committee member and Su Yu coincide.

Mao Zedong's name is Chen Su. Don't be impatient, wait for the opportunity, be patient, master the greatest strength, and don't split up easily.

Under this guidance, Su Yu even stopped containing the Sixth Battalion of the enemy in Pingyi, and kept them on the sidelines in secret, so that they could be used as raiders if necessary.

Running is not in vain, and hard work always pays off.

For more than a month, the national army was forced to move back and forth with Hua Ye, running more than a thousand miles. Needless to say, from a strategic point of view, the top leaders of the Kuomintang army, who have always been impatient, finally misjudged the real situation in Hua Ye.

Chen Cheng and Gu both thought that Chen Su's troops were bad for Lien Chan. They were too tired to fight any more. Now they have shown signs of retreating to central Shandong and northwest Shandong, and they have detected that the communists are building a bridge on the canal, probably crossing the Yellow River to the north. The national army has the conditions to boldly advance and destroy Chen Su in Yimeng Mountain area.

The official media of Nanjing Kuomintang released a newsletter, saying that Chen Su was disheartened and that hundreds of thousands of troops of the national army "took the lead in going north and annexing Yimeng". Deeply encouraged, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Gu, Tang and others to eliminate Chen Su's main force in early May.

Fourth, the inflection point of war induced by prisoners

On May 10, Gu ordered more than 250,000 people from Ouzhen, Tang and other departments to advance to Juxian, Yishui, Yuezhuang and Zibo respectively.

Tang pretended to be Chiang Kai-shek's favorite pupil, and before Europe and Wang could advance together, he led the troops to attack first. Before the war, Chiang Kai-shek admitted to slow and steady progress and changed to slow and steady attack. As a result, the various ministries of the national army began to appear inconsistent because of their different speeds and dense formations. The 7th Army and the entire 48th Division, the rightmost part of the Tang Corps, have made their mark.

Su Yu endured for a month and finally waited for the opportunity. Even though the ministries of the national army continued to respond, Su Yu clearly felt that the opportunity had come.

Chen Yu quickly ordered the ministries to move eastward, and exchanged fire with the 7th Army and the entire 48th Division, preparing to annihilate the enemy in Yishui area.

Halfway through the battle, Hua Ye's intelligence service suddenly reported to Su Yu that it had captured a national army and found the orders it carried. When Su Yu saw the telegram, she found that things were not good.

Originally, Tang ordered the whole 74th Division as the main force, and the whole 25th Division and the whole 83rd Division jointly attacked the Hua Ye headquarters in Tanbu. In order to prevent Hua Ye from escaping by taking advantage of loopholes or dividing his troops to annihilate, the 25th Division was ordered to protect Zhang Zuoyi and the 83rd Division to protect Zhang Zuoyi. In order to ensure the safety of the two wings of the three main divisions, let the whole 65th Division protect the left wing of the 25th Division, and the 7th Army and the 48th Division protect the right wing of the 83rd Division.

This is an interlocking and well-planned attack plan.

Tang assumed a posture of abandoning the car and attacking the handsome, preferring to lose the 48th Division of the 7th Army, but also crushing the headquarters of Hua Ye with the main force, in an attempt to destroy the nerve center of Chen Su in one fell swoop and trap the 200,000 troops in Hua Ye in the chaos.

This kind of situation, Su Yu also anticipated before the war, but never thought that Tang was so bold and crazy. This prisoner came too timely, leaving precious time for Su Yu to adjust his deployment.

After observation, Su Yu found that the only chance to counterattack the enemy lies in the whole 74th Division, which is the first-class main force in the center of the enemy formation.

Although the distance between this division and the 25 th and 83 rd divisions is not far, there seems to be signs of disconnection between them. Su Yu then put forward the tactics of center breakthrough to center breakthrough, which knocked out the enemy's core strength before the enemy's main force was completely surrounded, thus cracking the overall situation.

In hindsight, it is not difficult to say that this is to create a time difference and surround the enemy with superior forces.

However, Su Yu shoulders the fate of 200,000 troops in Hua Ye, which is strategically the fate of the entire Shandong battlefield. Once you can't fight well, as Zhang said, let the enemy center blossom, and it will all collapse.

In the face of this fleeting fighter, Su Yu resolutely changed the established plan and changed it to the 74th Division.

The concrete plan is that one, four, eight and ninety-four columns approach Tambu nearby and quickly cut off the connection between the 74th Division and the left and right wings. All the Fourth Route Army were near Tambu, and when they heard the news, they stopped around Zhang and were trapped. At the same time, the rapid northward movement hidden in southern Shandong blocked Zhang's only retreat.

Five verticals against Zhang, an reorganizer, nearly 5: 1. Su Yu took out half of Hua Ye's troops to deal with an enemy reorganization division, which was the greatest respect for the enemy tactically and the last honor that Zhang could enjoy as a soldier.

Four columns were arranged on the periphery, desperately blocking the rescue of the entire 25th and 83rd divisions.

There is no need to elaborate on the process.

Five columns stormed at all costs, and four columns blocked the periphery at all costs.

Zhang shouted his throat, and no one came to save him and killed him. The 25th Division and the 83rd Division are only 5km away from Meng Lianggu's position, and guns are heard, but they can't attack Hua Ye's resistance position.

Why did Hua Ye win?

Neither side has made any mistakes. In the end, it depends on whose vision is more accurate, whose command and dispatch are more flexible, and whose strength is more appropriate.

Su Yu has such a passage in his Memoirs of Su Yu's War:

"Here, I want to point out that in some later materials, our army captured Meng Lianggu soldiers, saying that the enemy's BGF 74th Division was delivered to the door alone. This statement does not conform to the reality of the battlefield. It does not reflect the enemy's operational intentions and trends, nor does it reflect the foresight and operational decision-making of our army. Because of the enemy's intention to make a breakthrough in our center, the situation of the enemy's 74th Division is bound to be slightly prominent, but before the battle, the enemy's two-wing troops were only four to six kilometers away from the 74th Division. The above statement may be because we don't understand the manufacturing and capture process of fighters. Starting from the traditional tactics usually adopted by our army, it is foolish to think of the enemy if it takes only one slap. "

Not discrediting the enemy is the greatest respect for yourself.