Marshal constellation

Of Chiang's "five main forces", two were wiped out by the Northeast Field Army (New 1 Army and New 6 Army), two by the East China Field Army (the whole 74th Division and 5th Army), and the other 18 Army was wiped out by Nakano with the support of Hua Ye. After these five main forces were completely eaten, it also marked a decisive victory in the war of liberation, but we should pay special attention to time.

The New 1 Army and the New 6 Army were compiled by the Ninth Corps of Liao Yaoxiang, the Northeast General Suppression Corps. During the Liaoshen Campaign, western Liaoning was besieged at the end of 1948+00. At this time, the northeast field army has occupied an absolute advantage in strength and firepower. When the eastern field guns and other longitudinal guns attacked Jinzhou, only more than 600 large-caliber guns over 75 mm were used, and the battlefield firepower completely crushed Fan and Liao Yaoxiang's troops.

Similarly, Chen Cheng's 18 army was completely annihilated in Shuangduiji in June 1948+02, while the 5th army was completely annihilated in Chenguanzhuang in early June 1949, which was the last stage of the Huaihai Campaign. That is to say, in the Armageddon after the People's Liberation Army took the strategic initiative, four of the five ace armies were completely annihilated, while the only 74th BGF Division (Army 74) among the five main forces was completely annihilated in May 1947+06, and it was under the eyes of the BGF Division 10 beside Chiang Kai-shek.

When Zhang was defeated and killed, it was the stage when Chiang Kai-shek launched a "key attack" on our base areas in Shandong and northern Shaanxi. Generally speaking, the enemy still has some military advantages. Su Yu commanded the 74th Division of the East China Field Army to be in a strategic defensive posture. Therefore, Mr. Chen said that this was the courage to "charge in a million troops", and the chairman commented: "The whole seventy-four division was wiped out, and two people couldn't think of it, one was Jiang and the other was me."

In sharp contrast, from the spring of 1946, Sun Liren's new 1 army and Liao Yaoxiang's new 6th army entered the northeast battlefield, and they have always been enemies of Dongye. During this period, Dongye has eaten part of the two armies, but it has never been able to give a devastating blow. The mantra circulated among Dongye cadres and soldiers is "eat cabbage to fight the new 6 th Army."

Is there any chance to hunt down these two ace troops in the wild? Yes, during the Siping Campaign in 1947 and the post-Zhangwu Campaign in 1948 1 month, the New Sixth Army came to help or fight, but Lin Biao did not choose to fight. In the late period of Siping campaign, when the new 6 th Army and other reinforcements approached, Dongye chose to leave the battle. After the Battle of Zhangwu, Lin Biao chose to eat the weakest of them, Chen Linda, who formed the new 5th Army.

1 948 65438+1October1,the Northeast Democratic Allied Forces was renamed the Northeast People's Liberation Army, and the total strength of the field army and the local army was no less than 700,000, while Dongye wiped out the enemy for the first time, that is, the Princess Tun Campaign, which was born in 654381October 4, and all the new 5 armies were destroyed. The two old enemies, the New 1 Army and the New 6 Army, were still undertaking mobile combat tasks in the northeast battlefield until the end of the Liaoshen Campaign.

Therefore, Lin Biao is too cautious in fighting, and will not make up his mind easily in a battle without absolute certainty. For example, before the Liaoshen campaign started, he asked Xibaipo to go south quickly with Dongye as the main force, regardless of the enemies of Changchun and Shenyang, and resolutely overcome the order of Jinzhou to close the northeast gate. He hesitated for nearly two months. After the deployment of attacking Shanxi was completed, Xibaipo lost his temper because of the unexpected situation that the enemy sent more troops to Tashan.

Note that even Xibaipo knows that Lin Biao is by no means afraid of war, but "does not gamble" in the battlefield situation where he is not absolutely sure. This way of fighting may miss some soldiers, but there will be no big mistakes. After the battles of Peiping, Tianjin, Sha Yi and Hengbao, the main forces of Song Xilian and Bai Chongxi were not captured for the first time, mainly because the deployment of the campaign was stable and the general attack was not launched without the full deployment of troops. It happened that Song Hebai was a prick, and when he found something bad, he quickly left.

Su Yu in general is different. Generally speaking, he dares to fight a decisive battle with the big corps only when he is six points sure of his own campaign planning. So before 1948, Hua Ye, with only 300,000 people, had eaten at least six enemy regiments in succession, including the 74th, 26th, 65th, 57th, 46th and 73rd divisions, which really hurt the enemy in East China.

Everything has two sides, and taking risks also means that there is the possibility of a horse slipping. Such as Nanma, Shao Lin, Shatuji and Yudong. All ended in a "battle caught in the middle" when our army was not well off, and the troops suffered heavy casualties. Hua Ye's withdrawal from the battlefield in these battles was actually a bit embarrassing. Fortunately, Su Yu command calm, well-directed, no loss of organizational system.

In Lin Biao's three-year war of liberation, only Siping was defeated, and Qingshuping was besieged by a division for losing contact. Other battles are completely orderly to win or stop, and it is not easy to move without more than 80% certainty. By the way, 1946' s first defeat in the defense of Siping in April is not counted. At that time, the "Northeast People's Autonomous Army" was not fully integrated, and the troops from several liberated areas did not form an overall combat effectiveness. Lin Biao didn't intend to defend his position, let alone be the head of the policy-making DongBeiJu.

During the "Armageddon" of the three major campaigns, the total strength of Dongye was about 700,000 (only referring to the field army, which increased to more than 880,000 when going south), while the total strength of Hua Ye was only about 420,000. As far as the number of regular enemy troops is concerned, Dongye is estimated to have wiped out 6.5438+0.5 million (before crossing the river) and Hua Ye is estimated to have wiped out 6.5438+0.85 million. Therefore, in terms of numbers alone, Su Yu's record is indeed greater.

However, we must look at this problem from two aspects. The cards in our hands are different, and the routines of playing cards are different. Lin Biao has a strong ability to crush the enemy, so it is heavier to arrange troops and crush the enemy a little; Su Yu often doesn't have much advantage in strength, so he is used to taking the sword aside, mobilizing and dividing the enemy in the movement, and then searching for a part. If you are compared to two swordsmen, the former is powerful, trying to crush the opponent completely on the whole, while the latter is light and elegant, and is good at finding the enemy's weakness and hitting it with one blow.

Based on the above-mentioned war history, my personal opinion is that I don't quite agree with the description of the word "the result is the same" in the title. A more accurate interpretation should be "each has his own merits". Su Lin is an outstanding senior commander of our army's large corps, and he also commands military commanders in two most important strategic areas. Their process from inferiority to superiority also represents that the war of liberation gradually turned from strategic defense to strategic attack, and finally made outstanding contributions to national liberation. The ranking of operational command level is in no particular order.

Lin Biao is just a tactician. It formulated its tactics under the guidance of the Central Committee. The starting point is high, and the central strategic goal is the northeast. Get help from the Soviet Union. Transfer all the elites of the Eighth Route Army to him. Hainan Island is not under his command. It's under the command of his people. Why did Kinmen lose? On the one hand, when the Korean War broke out, Jieshi had nowhere to retreat in Taiwan Province Province, and it would definitely be a desperate battle. Hainan Island is different. At that time, with the help of the Qiongya column and the Kuomintang, it was at the end of its tether. I have no stomach for a fight. If you can't keep it, you will retreat. Su Yu's starting point is different. The New Fourth Army is a local army. Originally in the central mind, as long as you are unbeaten. I don't have much hope. It was Su Yu who became famous with his strategy and tactics. The border center has an idea about him. Later, Shandong Corps was placed under his command. At first, why did some commanders of Shandong Corps refuse to accept it? The main reason is that your local army commands our central army. After several battles, no one refused. Lin Biao is surrounded by a group of senior assistants such as Luo Ronghuan and Liu Yalou. Su Yu's strategies and tactics were all formulated by himself. So I personally prefer Su Yu. Because his war of liberation was at least two years ahead of schedule. If Su Yu leads three columns south. The battlefield forces in the Central Plains are so thick. No one knows what war will be like. Lin Biao's million-strong army dare not fight. I will put Jieshi's lair there.

Su Yu's military command ability far exceeds that of Peng Zong and Lin Biao, but its influence and position are not as good as Peng Zong and Lin Biao. Lin Biao's military talents can't make it to the semi-finals, and Lin Biao's war is mainly to fight for superiority. Lin Biao is very difficult to fight.

Lin Biao's command style is cautious, slow and steady, and he won't start work without complete assurance.

It can be seen from his battle in Jinzhou that he was worried about the enemies of Changchun and Shenyang for a while and the reinforcements of Huludao on the western front for a while. Hesitant, still undecided, the chairman is not less angry about this matter.

Later, in the Korean War, Lin Biao didn't want to fight. On the one hand, he is really in poor health, on the other hand, he is used to being cautious in fighting with Americans and can't make up his mind.

And Su Yu's command style is to dare to fight, even if it is a five-point or even three-point battle.

It is this style that enabled him to make such big moves as Meng Lianggu Campaign and Huaihai Campaign. In Liu Bocheng's words, the Huaihai Campaign was a pot of uncooked rice. Finally, Su Yu was allowed to eat alive. He is the only person in the party who has the courage to fight this kind of war. Later, even Lin Biao himself admitted that he could not fight this immortal battle.

No, Lin Biao and Su Yu have completely different command styles.

Lin Biao is much more meticulous than Su Yu, while Su Yu is much more talented than Lin Biao.

This is not to criticize General Su Yu, but to say that the fighting styles of General Lin Biao and General Su Yu are fundamentally different.

On the question of Lin Biao's command style, we can look at the article "Lin Biao Division Chief teaches me to be a teacher" written by General Yang Chengwu, which shows Lin Biao's command style incisively and vividly.

The greatest characteristic of Lin Biao's command is meticulous. Before the war, he would collect as much information as possible, summarize information in many ways, and even go to the front to grasp the situation in person in order to judge the enemy's situation as accurately as possible.

Besides, if Lin Biao lives in the present, he must be a "big data expert". Lin Biao is very sensitive to data, and has very detailed requirements for the battle reports of various ministries. Even details such as how many officers and men were killed, how many spears were captured, and the specific models of the captured artillery have to be reported in detail.

It is precisely because of Lin Biao's obsession with details that he was able to accurately determine the position of the enemy field command post and defeat the enemy captive Liao Yaoxiang in one fell swoop through the nuances such as the ratio of short guns and long guns captured in Hu Jia's shack battle, the ratio of destroyed cars and carts, and the ratio of captured and killed officers and soldiers.

In other words, Lin Biao didn't rely on inspiration, but on data, or Lin Biao believed in data rather than an epiphany. However, it is often too dependent on data, which is easy to delay fighters.

General Su Yu pays more attention to the "flash of light", not that General Su Yu doesn't pay attention to data, but that he trusts his inspiration more than data.

Of course, this is the same as Su Yu in the war zone inside Shanhaiguan pass, surrounded by enemies. Many times, if conditions do not allow General Su Yu to collect enough information, he will make a judgment immediately.

At this time, the genius of the general is even more important.

So we see that General Su Yu decisively changed the Huai Hai Campaign from "small Huai Hai" to "big Huai Hai". Without much hesitation, he made up his mind in a short time with limited information.

However, to be honest, this command style is also easy to lead to failure, because a general's flashes can not always be correct; As the saying goes, how can you walk by the river for a long time without wet shoes?

For example, in the battle of Linqu in South Malaysia and the contest between Shandong and Fan Bingtuan, General Su Yu did not have the upper hand; Even Fan's corps vaguely suppressed General Su Yu at some time.

Don't say that Hua Ye is poorly equipped. In June1948,65438+10, General Su Yu personally said, "The firepower of the first, fourth and sixth columns of my first regiment is not worse than that of Chiang Kai-shek's first-class main force."

Of course, on the whole, the two generals have their own strengths, and they are also placed on the battlefield that suits them best; If General Su Yu is in the northeast and Lin Biao is in the pass, I'm afraid neither of them will play better than in history.

It must be said that both Lin Biao and Su Yu have excellent military talents, and their influence on the war of liberation is far-reaching. As we all know, the Kuomintang army has five main forces. At the beginning of the War of Liberation, Chiang Kai-shek dreamed of sweeping the country with the five main forces and completely destroying our army. As a result, two main forces died at the hands of Lin Biao, two were buried at the hands of Su Yu, and one was jointly destroyed by Hua Ye and Nakano. Lin Biao and Su Yu bloom in the northeast and east China respectively, and they are indeed the Gemini of our army.

So are these two men playing the same role in military command? In fact, it's hard to say, because the style difference between them is really a bit big. Lin Biao is very stable in fighting, and rarely fights unprepared battles. Because of this, Lin Biao seldom swallowed any defeat. Lin Biao can often command the army to win the final victory slowly and surely, and the Liaoshen Campaign is the best example. Lin Biao always keeps an eye on all directions and tries to avoid risks.

However, Lin Biao's style is also a double-edged sword. Lin Biao himself hesitated many times, and even almost delayed the fighter plane, which made the Central Committee quite unhappy. On the issue of Jinzhou, Lin Biao and the Central Committee even have differences. Finally, under the constant urging of Chairman Mao, Lin Biao made the final decision. Lin Biao later said that he formed this style because he was a heavy burden to defend the Central Committee for a long time, so he was cautious in fighting and didn't want to fight a risky war.

In contrast, Su Yu is much bolder. He not only dared to break into the enemy's encirclement, but also dared to mobilize a large corps to fight against the enemy when the odds were not high. He can be said to be a complete military adventurer. However, after all, Su Yu's military capability is quite excellent, and it can often win by gambling. His command style beat the Kuomintang army to the ground. However, we have to admit that Su Yu's style of play has obvious shortcomings, that is, the troops suffered serious war damage and failed to eat the enemy in many battles, such as the sand battle.

Lin Biao also analyzed the reasons for the formation of Su Yu's command style. He thought that Su Yu had to fight in the encirclement of the enemy because he was far away from the central government for a long time, so he had to take risks, thus forming this feature. In any case, they are excellent commanders of our army. Although the command styles vary greatly, they do have their own merits.

If we really want to say that their effect is the same, that is, they can all implement the central strategic thinking in their own way and finally realize the liberation of the whole country. The so-called "national chess game" is still very important in strategic thinking, which is the biggest magic weapon for our army to win. In fact, there are many excellent military commanders in Chiang Kai-shek's army, but they have not been guided by systematic strategic thinking at all, which Chiang Kai-shek lacks most.

Our Gemini is Marshal Peng, Marshal Lin Biao and Chairman Mao's right-hand man in the military. Su Yu is just a general, not up to standard at all. Chen Can's deputy commander of a field army and a general can't compare with Peng Lin, let alone Su Yu.

As a Gemini during the War of Liberation, the contrast between Su Yu and Lin Biao has always been an enduring topic. If there is anything in common between the two men, it is that they have made great contributions to the war of liberation, but their fighting styles are actually completely different, and they can be said to have their own advantages. During the whole period of the War of Liberation, Su Yu's commanding features were fully demonstrated, and the most obvious features include but are not limited to the following aspects:

First, it has strong mobile combat capability and strong ability to capture fighters. Su Yu didn't go to a military school, but he was a general who grew up in the war. Especially in the three-year guerrilla war in the south, although Su Yu led only a few thousand troops, he was independent, survived and developed independently, and was active in enemy-occupied areas, so he attached great importance to grasping the soldiers.

In Chairman Mao's words, Su Yu's team was small and flexible during this period. The key point is to destroy the enemy's effective strength, not to compete with the enemy for a short time, regardless of the gains and losses of a city and a place, and to strengthen ourselves in the process of destroying the enemy. Therefore, as long as there is an opportunity, we will not let it go and resolutely fight. If you find that the battlefield situation changes and it is not good for you, you will resolutely retreat without hesitation.

Therefore, Su Yu is often fifty percent sure to fight and dare to fight. For example, in the battle with the East, Lin Biao thought it was only 50% sure, but Su Yu fought resolutely. Especially when the Yellow Corps has broken through the sniper line and the battlefield situation has changed, Su Yu not only failed to retreat immediately, but attempted to directly take a big one and reimburse the Yellow Corps on the spot. This battlefield adaptability is excellent. I change when the enemy changes. Once I make up my mind, I won't waver easily.

Second, he is good at fighting when the comparison between the enemy and ourselves is unfavorable to us, and can capture fighters, constantly destroy the enemy's mobile power and constantly weaken the enemy. This is also his operational command style formed during the three-year guerrilla war. No matter during the three-year guerrilla war or the liberation war, Su Yu always lived in a bad environment, and the enemy was in an absolute advantage. However, Su Yu can still create fighters, capture fighters and destroy the enemy.

For example, during the War of Liberation, Su Yu's combat area was in East China, and whether it was in Central Jiangsu, Northern Jiangsu or Shandong, it was an area where elite enemies gathered and focused on attacking. In the early days of the war of liberation, according to the general strategic vision, this area was too close to the enemy's heart and was the key attack area of the enemy. It's no longer suitable to continue interior warfare, so we can only fight guerrilla warfare and harass the enemy, but Su Yu still dared to speak out and created a miracle of seven victories in interior warfare between the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union.

Third, he is good at catching the enemy's main force in the mobile warfare of the large corps, fighting annihilation and destroying the enemy through the whole system. This is also the basic requirement of the Red Army's operational command formed during the Jinggangshan period, but Su Yu has always insisted on this point, which can be said to have been brought to the extreme. Every battle is not to defeat the enemy, but to destroy the enemy within an organizational system, and you can supplement yourself by taking prisoners.

During the War of Liberation, Su Yu always insisted on destroying the enemy's effective forces with one organizational system, and often unexpectedly violated the ten military principles of our army. When the enemy attacked in multiple ways, he did not defeat the weak enemy first, but attacked the powerful enemy first. One of the most classic examples is the Battle of Menglianggu. In front of the enemy's ten reorganization divisions, the enemy's core main force, the 74th reorganization division, was suddenly dug out from the front and wiped out. Kuomintang and Communist Party didn't expect it, but Su Yu dared to do it.

Therefore, in the two years before the war of liberation, the elite and main enemy forces that were wiped out in the whole organizational system were the most in the battlefield in East China. It was not until the beginning of 1948 that the troops above the national army were completely wiped out in the northeast battlefield. However, Su Yu not only began to completely destroy the enemy's integrated divisions or troops a long time ago, but also destroyed more than two integrated divisions at one time in the Laiwu Campaign and the Lunan Campaign. In a single campaign, more than 50,000 opponents were destroyed, forcing the enemy to change tactics, and one army dared not act alone.

Fourth, although the tactics of encircling the main points for assistance had been formed as early as the Red Army period, Su Yu was not the first to adopt this tactic in the War of Liberation, and Liu Bocheng was the first to adopt it in the Shangdang Campaign, but Su Yu undoubtedly took the tactics of encircling the main points to the extreme. In fact, whether it is the war in the Soviet area, the war in eastern Henan or the war in Huaihai, there are obvious characteristics of encircling the main points for assistance. Even the battle of Jinan was an attempt to besiege Jinan, attract Qiu Qingquan Corps to help, and then panic in it.

But what needs to be explained here is that Su Yu does not follow the general rules and regulations, but is very flexible and adjusts its strategy and tactics at any time according to the battlefield situation. If he can help others, he will help others, but he will also adopt other tactics. For example, the campaigns of Lunan, Laiwu and Menglianggu were not all aimed at winning aid, but when the enemy attacked in different ways, they suddenly turned their attention from the west and built fighter planes through the movement and strength of large corps.

Fifth, because Su Yu has lived and developed independently in an environment far from the direct command of the central government for a long time, Su Yu has developed the habit of thinking independently, not step by step, but will put forward his own ideas to his superiors according to the actual situation. Of course, this is also because during the period when the anti-Japanese advance team went north, Le and others carried out the orders of the central authorities too mechanically, which led to the stimulation of Lien Chan's losing streak and almost total annihilation. Su Yu paid special attention to the actual situation.

Therefore, at the beginning of the war of liberation, Su Yu put forward the idea of inside-line body count when the central authorities actually intended to give up the Soviet base areas. The result was seven wins out of seven. The boldest thing is that the Central Committee asked Su Yu to lead three columns to cross the river south and harass the enemy's rear. However, after comprehensive consideration, Su Yu dared to speak out and called for a suspension of southward advance and a great annihilation war north of the Yangtze River, which changed the decision of the Central Committee.

In contrast, although Su Yu also lost the battle, the characteristics of operational command are very distinct, while Lin Biao is too cautious and always insists on not fighting an uncertain battle, even if he is only 70% sure, he will be very hesitant. For example, the argument about whether to fight Jinzhou or Changchun in Liaoshen Campaign, and the fact that fighting Jinzhou has already started, was once determined to waver and tried to go back to fight Changchun, which was a taboo for military strategists.

This kind of indecision, if it is comparable to the opponent, or the strength is not far behind, if the opponent does not make mistakes, it is difficult to create and capture a better fighter. For example, if Su Yu is transferred to the northeast to command, the Liaoshen Campaign may be fought ahead of schedule, but if Lin Biao is transferred to the Huaihai Campaign, the result is hard to say, and it is hard to say whether Chengdu can still fight. Chairman Mao and Liu Bocheng both admitted that the Huaihai Campaign was a pot of uncooked rice, and Su Yu dared to do it. With Lin Biao's character, he may not dare to fight.

Lin Biao and Su Yu are recognized as the God of War on the war stage of our army. The same is true of the command and grasp of battlefields and campaigns.

First, both of them are good at commanding large corps operations. Together with Deng Hua, they are the only three senior generals in our army who have commanded a million-strong army.

Second, both of them are good at mobile warfare, making fighter planes and destroying a large number of enemies in sports.

Third, in the war of liberation, the troops under its jurisdiction were the two units with the largest number of enemy fighters in our army.

Fourth, the difference between them lies in the different ideas and styles of operational command.

Lin Biao tries to have a clear plan in battle, and generally doesn't like taking risks. Many of the war examples he commanded were based on more wars and fewer wars.

Su Yu's command and operations are often surprisingly successful, and most of them get twice the result with half the effort. He is a general who can fight hard, evil and dangerous battles in our army.

It is precisely because of their mature art of war command that they became the first and second candidates for the highest head of the Volunteers after the outbreak of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.

Su Yu, a self-taught student, came out step by step from being the monitor of Nanchang Uprising to being able to command hundreds of thousands of people in the War of Liberation. Look at the evaluation of him.

1February, 946, when Su Yu organized a large corps to fight, he used flexible and eclectic soldiers, which was praised by Chen Yi as "the more strange, the better".

On August 28th, 1946, Mao Zedong telegraphed the operational experience of the Central China Field Army: "Su Yu was correct in command, flexible and brave, so he was able to win a total victory".

1949, Mao Zedong said, "In the Huaihai Campaign, Su Yu made the first contribution".

In 1949, Liu Bocheng said: "Comrade Su Yu is a brilliant figure with profound wisdom and courage. He is the best general of our army and the strategist of China. "

1On August 27th, 955, Su Yu was named as one of the "Top Ten Generals".

1988 10, Su Yu was named one of the "36 Founding Military Strategists in China" by the Central Military Commission.

1992, the People's Liberation Army Press Wang Xixian published an article "On Su Yu's Military Thought", saying: "Su Yu is an outstanding strategist and strategist".

Lin Biao, who graduated from the fourth phase of Whampoa Military Academy, also grew up step by step. Chiang Kai-shek commented that he was good at fighting. Although he is a fourth-grade student, his command ability is not bad. You can see how good Lin Biao is. Two people have their own characteristics.